We just don't know how they got them

"They have more money to pay for things," said Steve Pelak, a deputy chief of the Justice Department's counterespionage section who points to the amounts given to Shriver before he was ever in a position to access, much less pass, secrets. Still more money is going to private firms to help develop and build China's military technology, sometimes through parts obtained illegally from U.S. manufacturers. Indeed most of the Justice Department cases reviewed by the AP involve the illegal export of restricted defense-related parts or so-called "dual-use" technology, which can have commercial or military applications. These are items such as integrated circuits for radar systems, high-power amplifiers designed for use in early-warning radar and missile target acquisition systems, and military grade night-vision technology. But that only scratches the surface. Other cases involve the theft of trade secrets by individuals once employed at major U.S. corporations, including Boeing, Motorola and Dow. In some instances, the secrets were computer source codes or, in cases still awaiting trial, related to the development of organic pesticides and telephone communications technology. Stolen information about the space shuttle and technical data about the capabilities of the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered submarines have also been passed along, as has simulation software used to help train fighter pilots. While export cases and economic espionage comprise most of the China-related intelligence prosecutions in recent years, there have been a few notable instances of more traditional espionage among them the Rosetta Stone German Shriver case and that of Tai Shen Kuo, a Louisiana businessman born in Taiwan who obtained information from two federal government employees that he passed to China. It all fits into what some experts call China's "vacuum cleaner" approach to information-collection: Catch whatever you can. "It's a little like ... the cancer that you don't know your body has. You don't know that you're in trouble until it manifests itself in ways that really, really hurt you," said Michelle Van Cleave, another former National Counterintelligence Executive who served under President George W. Bush. She points to revelations that surfaced throughout the 1990s regarding China's procurement of U.S. nuclear secrets. The public controversy came to a head in 1999, when a select congressional committee was named to investigate Chinese espionage and security concerns at U.S. weapons labs. Then came the government's bungled handling of Wen Ho Lee, the former scientist once identified as the focus of a probe into the theft of nuclear secrets at Los Alamos National Laboratory who wound up pleading guilty to a single count of downloading sensitive material. Intelligence assessments later concluded that China's successful nuclear espionage effort dated back to at least the late 1970s, and reports blamed everything from foreign visitor and scientific exchange programs to espionage on the part of scientists such as Peter Lee, another Los Alamos researcher who did share classified information with Chinese scientists. But as Van Cleave points out: The exact methods used to acquire those secrets may never be known. "We know they have them," she said. "We just don't know how they got them." Today, with ever more cases being prosecuted, we do know more not only about what's being pursued, but how and why."If you have customers in mainland China, please let us know if we could be of any help.

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